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Abstract
We propose a dynamic general equilibrium model with human capital
accumulation to evaluate the economic consequences of compulsory services
(such as military draft or social services). Our analysis identifies a so far ignored
dynamic cost arising from distortions in time allocation over the life-cycle. We
provide conservative estimates for the excess burden that arises when the
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expenditures. Our results suggest that eliminating the draft could produce
considerable dynamic gains, both in terms of GDP and lifetime utility.
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To recruit military manpower, governments can rely on conscription (the draft),
on voluntary enlistments, or on a combination of both. The United Kingdom
and the United States have historically relied on a volunteer military while many
countries in continental Europe traditionally got most of the military personnel
through conscription. Recently a number of countries, including France, Spain,
the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy, have abolished or started to phase out
conscription; other countries such as Germany or Poland are discussing such
a move. As a corollary to the military draft, most democratic countries o¤er
conscripts who object to bearing arms the option of civil service, i.e., to take active
duty in social services, elsewhere in the public sector or in certain associations
rather than in the army. In several countries (notably in Germany) draftees in the
social sector make substantial or, according to some supporters of conscription,
even indispensable contributions to the welfare system.
In its common form a draft system with compulsory military or social service
has two speci…c features: First, it only a¤ects males (Israel being a prominent
exception).1 Second, draftees are paid well below market rates for similar types
o fs e r v i c e s ,b o t hi nt h em i l i t a r ya n di nt h es o c i a ls e c t o r . 2 This second feature
leads many observers to believe that the draft opens an inexpensive way for the
government to provide military or other services. Yet economists have argued
since long that the cheap-labor argument is misleading since it confuses account-
ing (money) costs with opportunity (real) costs. The main economic arguments
against the draft are the following (Hansen and Weisbrod, 1967; Fisher, 1969; Lee
and McKenzie, 1992; Sandler and Hartley, 1995, Chapter 6; Warner and Asch,
2001):
² The draft imposes opportunity costs on conscripts which do not show up
in …scal budgets. The opportunity costs exceed budgetary costs by the
maximum amount draftees are willing to pay to avoid compulsory service.
This can be calculated as the di¤erence between potential market income
and the lower pay during the service plus the monetarized disutility from
1However, even in countries with a draft system not every young and able-bodied man is
required to actually do the service: E.g., when a universal draft (of males) delivers too many
personnel, ballots might be used to determine whom to actually call up. Moreover, certain
classes of individuals (e.g., clergymen or cases of special hardship) are automatically exempt in
most draft systems.
2Currently, young conscripts in Germany are paid between 7.41 and 8.95 euros per day plus
some allowances for food and clothing. In Finland, daily pay varies between 3.60 during the …rst
6 months and 8.25 euros after 9 months. People doing civil service are also provided housing
and 8.90 euros per day in case the employer provides no meals. Denmark is a less drastic case:
Draftees do not get free meals, but receive 359 euros per month for living expenses, and the
taxable salary varies between 526 euros during the …rst 4 months and 1,722 euros after one
year.
1having to work in an occupation and under circumstances that draftees
would otherwise not have chosen.
² Independently on how it is acquired, manning an army or the welfare indus-
try comes at the cost of labor input foregone in other sectors of the economy.
Productivity-based market wages re‡ect this cost while a purely …scal per-
spective based on draftees’ arbitrary and low pay understates them.
² The draft leads to an ine¢cient match between people and jobs and thus to
an avoidable loss in output. Young men are rather arbitrarily allocated to
military or social work without consideration of productivity, comparative
advantages, and outside options.
² The allocation of labor within the military may be ine¢cient for two rea-
sons. First, cheap labor may lead to an excessive use of personnel and thus
a waste of resources. Second, the productivity of draftees in military and
social sectors is lower than the productivity of professionals due to shorter
periods of training, higher turnover rates and lack of motivation and incen-
tives.
While the static e¢ciency losses of a draft system are sizeable,3 we argue in
this paper that the draft also involves additional dynamic costs that have been
ignored so far. The draft creates an intertemporal excess burden on the economy
by distorting the allocation of time over the life cycle for conscripts, and by
front-loading the cost of …nancing public services to the early years of life. In
particular, the system postpones or interrupts draftees’ education and training,
shortens their work careers, and reduces the present value of lifetime income.
The draft system thus slows down the accumulation of both human and physical
capital, with negative and lasting impacts on labor productivity and aggregate
output.
Conscription has a negative impact on human capital formation since young
men (and sometimes women) typically are called up to compulsory service during
a period of their lives which they otherwise would devote to learning or gathering
…rst experiences on the job. In many countries, male high-school graduates do
compulsory military service immediately after leaving school and begin univer-
sity studies or vocational training after …nishing the duty.4 Firms may even be
reluctant to train high-school graduates unless they have …nished or are exempt
from military service, because military and civil service authorities do not always
3E.g., Kerstens and Meyermans (1993) estimate that the social cost of the (now abolished)
Belgian draft system amounted to twice the budgetary cost. Reviewing several studies, Lutz
(1996) reports that the opportunity cost of conscription in the German army is between euro
2.2 and 6.7 billion per annum.
4In 1998, compulsory military service in Germany (which lasted 12 months then) on average
delayed the start of university studies by 16 to 18 months (DSW, 2000; Lewin et al., 2000).
2refrain from calling young men to service during their formal vocational training.
Most young men without high-school degrees are drafted shortly after …nishing
their apprenticeship or vocational training. The draft prevents them from deep-
ening or acquiring relevant professional experience, and freshly gained job-speci…c
skills depreciate during compulsory service.5
Apart from distorting human capital accumulation, there is a second channel
through which the draft might impose a dynamic burden on society. Draftees
typically earn a low payment, and the di¤erence between this payment and the
market value of their labor supply corresponds to a supplementary income tax
levied exclusively on draftees during the service. Taxes could alternatively be
collected from all age cohorts alive in a certain period (possibly including the
non-drafted part of the population). This is basically the way how a voluntary
military is …nanced. Appropriately designed, such a general tax could, in every
period, earn the same revenue for the government as the speci…c tax on draftees’
income. However, by spreading tax liabilities more evenly over the life cycle the
general tax would come at a much smaller cost in terms of the present value of
lifetime income than a single and non-recurring supplementary tax on income
during conscription. In the presence of consumption smoothing, a more even
spread of tax liability over the life cycle would increase private saving and the
accumulation of physical capital.
The adverse e¤ects of the draft system on human and physical capital have
not received much interest in the literature. To our knowledge, no study exists
that deals with the impact of the draft on physical capital while only few studies
discuss human capital issues of the draft. In passing, Fisher (1969) mentions the
impact of the American draft lottery in the 1960s on human capital decisions and
suggests that uncertainty might impose a dynamic cost on the economy. In an
econometric analysis, Imbens and van der Klaauw (1995) …nd that conscription in
the Netherlands during the 1980s and early 1990s reduced earnings for conscripts
by 5 per cent relative to the non-drafted men of the same cohort. Similar results
are obtained by Angrist (1990) for American Vietnam War conscripts. In an
empirical study of wage e¤ects due to career interruptions in Germany, Kunze
(2002) …nds that compulsory service increases wage income for men by 3.2 percent
during the …rst year after conscription and depresses wage income beyond the …rst
year, where the gap in wages increases with time.6 T ot h ee x t e n tt h a te a r n i n g
di¤erentials re‡ect di¤erences in human capital formation, empirical evidence
5Time spent in the military or in the social sector is not entirely wasteful with respect to
human capital accumulation, but the skills aquired there are of only limited value to most
draftees.
6Kunze (2002) suggests that the increase in wage income during the …rst year after conscrip-
tion is driven by e¤ects unrelated to human capital, e.g. by signalling e¤ects. Alternatively,
the wage increase immediately after conscription might be caused by lower wage o¤ers before
conscription since the authorities sometimes call up people during apprenticeship or vocational
training.
3thus supports the view that the draft involves dynamic costs from postponement
of education and shorter work careers.
We identify and assess dynamic costs of conscription in a general equilibrium
model based on individual life cycle decisions. Individuals allocate time across
work, learning and leisure and maximize intertemporal utility subject to an in-
tertemporal budget constraint. We calibrate …rst the model to a steady state
equilibrium without compulsory service. The production of …nal goods combines
labor services and physical capital, and aggregate output is either invested or
consumed by both individuals and the public sector. Public expenditures are …-
nanced by a proportional tax rate on labor income, and the government operates
with a dynamic budget constraint that is balanced in each period. Conscription
is then introduced as an obligation by a share of the population to spend the
…rst economically active year doing work instead of being allowed to freely allo-
cate time between work, learning and leisure. We distinguish two features of the
draft. First, we assume that labor services during conscription are paid at the
market wage rate. Second, we introduce a supplementary tax on income during
conscription.
Our results show that both the constraint on time and the supplementary in-
come tax during conscription create dynamic excess burdens (output and utility
losses). Ignoring general equilibrium e¤ects, the constraint on allocation of time
distorts investment in human capital, while the supplementary tax on income
has a negative impact on private saving and physical capital accumulation. The
impact of the draft is signi…cant at the individual level. More than a decade
after completion of conscription, former conscripts have not caught up in pro-
ductivity compared to non-conscripts at the same age. The economic burden of
the draft may also have negative income e¤ects for non-conscripts due to general
equilibrium e¤ects.
2T h e M o d e l
We apply a dynamic life cycle model in which individuals spend time on labor
supply, learning and leisure. Private and public agents have perfect knowledge
about current and future economic events, and individuals maximize lifetime util-
ity from consumption and leisure subject to an intertemporal budget constraint.
Labor income taxes are collected by the public sector to satisfy a given revenue
requirement, which is spent on public provision of goods and services.
The model represents a closed economy where the production technology com-
bines labor services and physical capital. Perfect competition prevails in each
market, and private and public agents take output and factor prices as given.
Individuals are economically active for 60 years, beginning at age 18 and ending
at age 77.
Including human capital formation provides one way of explaining the exis-
4tence of wage di¤erentials over the life cycle. Individuals can invest in human
capital or invest in …nancial assets. Investment in human capital is costly and
speci…c to each individual, and it is therefore concentrated at the beginning of
the life cycle and ends when retirement sets in.7 Human capital depreciates at
a constant rate, and the wage rate per unit of working time thus declines when
learning ends.
There are two di¤erent types of individuals in the model: conscripts (indexed
by subscript f) and non-conscripts (subscript q). Conscripts are subject to draft
and are forced to spend their time on work in the …rst period of the life cycle,
possibly with a low income. Non-conscripts do not face the time constraint or
the supplementary tax.
2.1 Intertemporal Optimization
In each period of the life cycle, individuals divide time between work, t,l e a r n i n g ,
v, and leisure, y. The economic life-span of each individual consists of 60 periods,
each period representing one year, and the periods are indexed from 0 to 59.
Total use of time in each period cannot exceed the endowment of time:
yl>w + tl>w + vl>w · h> (1)
where h is the constant endowment of time in each period. The endowment of
time denotes hours available to work, learning and leisure, and it is therefore
interpreted as the normal length of a work week, say 40 hours. Subscript w refers
to the person’s age, and subscript l indicates whether the individual is or has
been subject to conscription (l = f)o rn o t( l = q).
Gross investment in human capital is determined by learning, and the stock
of human capital evolves according to the following law of motion:
kl>w+1 =( 1¡ 
K) ¢ kl>w + v

l>w> (2)
where k is the individual stock of human capital, 
K is the rate of depreciation
with respect to human capital, and  measures the elasticity of new human capital
with respect to learning, where 0 ?· 1. This speci…cation implies that learning
is spread more evenly across time when  falls. The initial stock of human capital,
k0, is positive and every person enters the economy with some productive skills.
The e¤ective supply of labor services depends on time devoted to work and




where o is the individual supply of labor services, and  denotes the elasticity
of labor services with respect to the stock of human capital. We assume that
7New human capital can be produced through education and formal/informal on-the-job
training, together referred to as learning.
50 ??1, implying diminishing marginal productivity of human capital in the
supply of labor services. Marginal and average labor productivity is independent
of working time and equal to human capital raised to the power of .8
The individual maximization problem is based on an explicit representation


















where f is consumption of goods, y is demand for leisure,  is the rate of time
preference,  is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (), 
measures the weight assigned to leisure in the instantaneous utility function, and
the coe¢cient  re‡ects the rate at which the marginal utility of leisure decreases
as the amount of leisure is increased.
The speci…cation of the instantaneous utility function implies that individuals
smoothe consumption over the life cycle, whereas leisure is not necessarily con-
sumed in every period. Marginal utility from leisure is  ¢ (1 ¡ 2yl>w)>l2f f>qg,
where marginal utility is constant if  is equal to zero. A natural upper bound for
 is 1@2h, which implies that the marginal utility of leisure goes to zero if time is
spent entirely on leisure. Contrary to popular constant elasticity of substitution
formulations of the utility function, the additively separable utility function al-
lows the point in time at which the individual begins to retire to be endogenous.
Retirement begins when the individual starts to demand a positive amount of
leisure, which means that less time than the normal work week is devoted to
work and human capital formation.
The quadratic utility function with respect to leisure allows us to capture
two labor market features. First, the demand for leisure is concentrated at the
end of the life cycle. Active labor market participation is phased out at old age
since labor productivity falls. The fall in productivity at old age follows from
intertemporal maximization of lifetime utility. Since the return to investment
in human capital depends on remaining lifetime, human capital accumulation is
concentrated in the beginning of the life cycle and phased out towards the end
of life. Human capital depreciates at a constant rate, and the opportunity cost
to leisure thus declines when learning ends. Second, the model captures the idea
that people typically require a higher marginal wage compensation when leisure
time is scarce.
Individuals are born without …nancial wealth, and they can save and borrow
without liquidity constraints at the market interest rate, u. The lifetime budget
constraint states that the present value of lifetime expenditures on consumption
8Marginal and average labor productivity will also depend on working time if we use ho-
mothetic Cobb-Douglas or CES speci…cations. If one of these speci…cations is applied, labor
productivity may increase at the end of the life cycle when working time decreases.
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(1 + u)w ¢ fl>w> (5)
where z is the marginal productivity of labor services, and o is the tax rate on
wage income. Therefore, z(1 ¡ o) is the return to labor services after tax. The
price of the consumption good is chosen as numéraire and normalized at unity.
Each individual maximizes the present value of lifetime utility, X, subject to the
time endowment constraint, the law of motion with respect to human capital,
and the intertemporal budget constraint.
2.2 Conscription
Having established the intertemporal maximization problem for each individual,
we next describe how the draft system is introduced in the model. We assume
that conscripts are forced to spend available time in the …rst period of the life
cycle on work, i.e. tf>0 = h. Wage income during conscription can be subject to
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(1 + u)w ¢ ff>w> (6)
where  is the supplementary tax rate on wage income during conscription. Since
z(1¡o) is the return to labor services after tax,  =0corresponds to a situation
where conscripts receive the market value of labor (net of income taxes), whereas
 =1corresponds to a situation where conscripts receive no pay. The true value
of  is di¢cult to estimate; it furthermore varies with family and educational
status.9
The use of time is constrained to work in the …rst period of the life cycle
for conscripts, and the extra payments from conscripts do not further distort
the allocation of time. However, the extra payment reduces private saving by
conscripts since private consumption is determined by lifetime income and follows
an exponential pattern over the life cycle, where the consumption growth rate
is determined by the Euler condition (the di¤erence between the real interest
rate and the rate of time preference divided by the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution).
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(1 + u)w ¢ fq>w= (7)
9Schleicher (1996) estimates that net income foregone for an average German conscript in
1993 was 2.4 times the pay during conscription — which implies that  =2 =4@3=4=0 =7.
72.3 General Equilibrium
The life cycle model is used to simulate steady state equilibrium e¤ects of the
restriction on time allocation and the supplementary tax. Since population
growth is not important to the analysis, each cohort size is kept constant and
normalized at unity. Prices and aggregate quantities are constant in steady state,
and the variables do not carry time indices unless necessary.
Consumption and investment decisions by the representative individuals re-
‡ect the behavior of current generations in the steady state equilibrium. It is
therefore simple to derive the aggregate supply of labor services to the labor
market and the aggregate private demand for leisure, learning and consumption
in the steady state. The aggregate supply of labor services is equal to the weighted
sum of the supply of labor services over the life cycle for the two di¤erent types
of individuals:
O = % ¢
59 X
w=0




where O is the aggregate supply of labor services in steady state, and % is the
share of the population subject to conscription.
The production of …nal goods combines labor services and physical capital,




where \ is aggregate output, N is the aggregate stock of physical capital, and !
is the value share of physical capital. Each producer of goods maximizes pro…ts
subject to the production technology (9), and the …rst order conditions imply
that the marginal product of a particular factor input is equal to the producer
price of that factor input.
Physical capital depreciates at rate 
N A 0. The capital stock in period w is
equal to the capital stock at the beginning of the previous period less depreciation
plus investment in the previous period. As the capital stock is constant in the
steady state, gross investment L in physical capital is given by:
L = 
N ¢ N= (10)
Aggregate output is either invested or consumed by individuals or the public
sector, and the market clearing condition for output is:
\ = F + L + J> (11)
where F is aggregate private consumption and J is the public consumption. Fi-
nally, the government operates with a dynamic budget constraint that is balanced
in each period:

o ¢ z ¢ O + % ¢ ( ¢ z(1 ¡ 
o) ¢ of>0)=J= (12)
8The total tax revenue from the proportional and supplementary tax rates on
wage income on the left-hand side is equal to the cost of public provision of goods
and services on the right-hand side.
2.4 Welfare E¤ects
We use the equivalent variation measure to assess the welfare e¤ects of introduc-
ing conscription. This measure is derived as the percentage change in lifetime
earnings necessary to yield the utility level reached in the new steady state. More
formally, it is determined by:
^ Xl(Hl>0 ¢ (1 + "l)>u 0>z 0)=^ Xl(Hl>1>u 1>z 1) (13)
where ^ Xl denotes the indirect utility function for group l = f>q,a n dHl is the net
present value of group l’s lifetime income. As we focus on the factor prices faced
by individuals, we de…ne z0 and z1 to measure after-tax wage rates. Therefore,
they combine the changes in gross wage rates and in wage tax rates. The sub-
scripts 0 and 1 denote initial steady state values without and with conscription,
respectively. The variable "l measures the change in group l’s welfare between
the two steady states. This welfare measure can be compared across di¤erent
steady states and is applicable for changes of any size and not only di¤erential
approximations.
3 Calibration
There is no draft system in the initial steady state equilibrium, i.e. there is
initially no distinction between conscripts and non-conscripts. The model is cali-
brated to the data set presented in Table 1, and the following standard parameter
values are applied in the baseline scenario. Capital income accounts for 31.2 per-
cent of GDP and labor income accounts for 68.8 percent of GDP, which implies
that the labor-capital income ratio is equal to 2.2. The level of investment is equal
to 20.8 percent of GDP, given a net interest rate of 5 percent and a 10 percent
depreciation rate with respect to physical capital. To achieve a su¢ciently high
p r i v a t es a v i n gr a t e ,t h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c ei ss e te q u a lt o3 . 1p e r c e n t . W e
assume that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is equal to 0.667, which
is within the range from 0.5 to 1 that is used in most numerical studies.
The tax revenue from the wage income tax in the initial steady state is equal
to 25.8 percent of GDP. This revenue is achieved by a 37.5 percent tax rate on
9wage income.
Table 1.  Parameter values, tax rates and factor prices in the initial steady
state equilibrium.
Parameter values:
ρ Time preference rate 0.031
σ Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 0.667
µ Coefficient in quadratic utility function 0.250
α Weight parameter in quadratic utility function wrt. leisure 0.750
η Elasticity of human capital wrt. time devoted to learning 0.750
δH Depreciation rate for human capital 0.100
β Elasticity of labor services wrt. human capital 0.350
φ Value share of physical capital in production of goods 0.312
δK Depreciation rate for physical capital 0.100
h0 Initial human capital stock 1.000
e Endowment of time in each period 1.000
Tax rates:
τl Tax rate on labor income 0.375
Factor prices:
r Annual interest rate 0.050
w Wage rate before tax 1.600
We choose parameter values such that the average individual labor supply
pro…le resembles the estimated average individual labor supply pro…le (measured
in hours worked) for recent generations in McGratten and Rogerson (1998). Fig-
ure 1 illustrates the allocation of time over the life cycle for the representative
agent in the initial steady state. Human capital formation is highest at the be-
ginning of the life cycle, roughly constant between the age of 25 and 55, and then
phased out. Retirement starts at the age of 63, and time spent on leisure exceeds
time spent working around the age of 70.
Age
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10Investment in human capital is costly and speci…c to each individual, and it is
concentrated in the beginning of the life cycle. The marginal product of human
capital investment falls with the level of learning, and the buildup of human
capital is thus spread over several periods. Figure 2 shows that labor productivity
in the …rst period of the life cycle is normalized at unity, and it increases during
the …rst 10 years of the life cycle. The level of labor productivity is maintained
during the next 30 years and falls when the individual begins to retire from the
labor market. Human capital depreciates at a constant rate, and the wage rate
per unit of working time is falling during the last third of the life cycle.
Age
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4R e s u l t s
We next introduce a draft system and analyze the economic e¤ects of the reform.
Conscripts are constrained in the use of time in the …rst period of the life cycle,
and they may be paid less than what would be the value of their labor services
after the ordinary wage tax. This is formalized as a supplementary tax being
imposed on their net wage income in the …rst period, net wage income meaning
the after-tax value of their labor supply. Public spending on goods and services
is held constant, and the proportional tax rate on wage income is determined
endogenously to balance the public budget. To assess the long run impacts of
the policy reform, the simulated policy changes are compared with a baseline
simulation re‡ecting the initial steady state.
114.1 Income and Welfare E¤ects
Introducing a draft system has negative e¤ects in the long run on income and
consumption. This is driven partly by direct e¤ects on draftees, and partly by
indirect general equilibrium e¤ects of changes in factor prices on the behavior of
non-draftees. Table 2 shows that GDP and consumption decrease with 0.2 percent
when 25 percent of the population is subject to draft and the supplementary tax
rate is equal to 0. The reduction in private saving is more signi…cant than the
fall in labor services, and the capital intensity goes down. The decrease in capital
intensity drives up the return on physical capital and drives down the gross wage
rate. The reduction in labor income erodes the tax revenue from the tax rate on
labor income, and the tax rate on labor income goes up. The negative impact
on the economy is more signi…cant when the share of the population subject
draft increases, and GDP decreases by 0.7 percent when the entire population is
subject to draft and the supplementary tax rate is equal to 0.
Table 2.  Effects of move to draft system (percentage change from initial steady state equilibrium)
a
Share of population subject to draft
25 percent 50 percent 100 percent
Supplementary tax rate Supplementary tax rate Supplementary tax rate
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Note: (a) the initial tax rate on wage income is 37.5 percent, (b) measured in percentage points.
Table 2 also shows that supplementary tax payments by conscripts increase
the negative e¤ects on income and consumption. The revenue from the supple-
mentary tax rate is spent on a reduction in the tax rate on labor income, and the
reform thus transfers income from conscripts to non-conscripts, and from young
generations to old generations who are not subject to draft. The impact on the
economy may be signi…cant. For example, GDP falls by 3 percent if the entire
population is subject to draft and no income is paid during conscription. Most of
the decrease in GDP is due to reduced private saving, and the capital intensity
in the economy drops further. Changes in net factor prices thus move further
apart, with an increase in the return on physical capital and a decrease in the
net wage rate.
Figures 3a and 3b illustrate the e¤ects on individual learning decisions when
25 percent of the population is subject to conscription and the supplementary tax
rate on net wage income is 50 percent. Conscripts are forced to spend available
time on work in the …rst period of the life cycle, where labor productivity is low
12and a signi…cant share of their time otherwise would be spent on learning. They
compensate for the initial loss in learning by raising learning e¤orts in the …rst
couple of years after conscription. Lifetime income is reduced by the ine¢cient
allocation of time and the supplementary tax payments during conscription, and
conscripts raise learning e¤orts late in the life cycle to compensate for the income
loss.
Non-conscripts, on the other hand, marginally reduce their learning period.
The increase in the interest rate reduces the present value of the return to learning
and leads to a reduction in human capital accumulation. Investment in human
capital is also reduced by the decrease in the net wage rate. The reduced net wage
rate leads to an increase in the demand for leisure. Earlier retirement reduces the
amortization period for investment in human capital and leads to less learning.
Hence, the opposite changes in net factor prices both have negative impacts on

























20 30 40 50 60 70
Individual human capital depreciates over time, and the lack of learning in
the …rst period of the life cycle has a negative impact on labor productivity
for conscripts during the …rst ten years on the labor market compared to the
initial labor productivity pro…le (Figure 4a). Labor productivity is unchanged at
middle-age, and the extended learning period increases labor productivity at the
end of the life cycle. The small negative impact on labor productivity at the end
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14Age
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Figures 5a and 5b show the e¤ects on individual labor supply decisions for
conscripts and non-conscripts, respectively. Conscripts reduce their labor force
participation rates during the …rst couple of years after conscription has ended
and build up human capital instead. Labor force participation rates return to
normal at middle-age, and the increased labor productivity at the end of the life
cycle provides an incentive to postpone retirement and stay longer in the labor
market. Non-conscripts retire a little earlier compared to the initial steady state
equilibrium, which re‡ects the small reduction in labor productivity at the end
of the life cycle.
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Table 3 presents the welfare e¤ects for conscripts and non-conscripts for dif-
ferent initial proportional tax rates on labor income and supplementary tax rates.
We keep the supply of physical capital and labor services constant across di¤erent
initial levels of public spending, i.e. the capital-labor ratio is unchanged. Net
factor prices are kept unchanged as well, and the cost of labor services varies with
the initial tax rate on labor income. I.e. the capital value share falls when the
initial tax rate on labor income increases.10 Finally, the level of output is adjusted
to meet the changes in public spending requirements. This method implies that
the tax base with respect to the supplementary tax rate is unchanged across the
di¤erent initial steady state equilibria.
Table 3.  Effects of move to draft system across initial public expenditure levels (percentage change from initial steady
state equilibrium)a
Supplementary tax rate



































Note: (a) 25 percent of the population is subject to draft.
The results indicate that conscripts may experience a signi…cant welfare loss,
while the welfare e¤ects for non-conscripts are less certain. The reform leads to
a reduction in labor income and thus erodes the tax revenue from the tax rate
10If capital value share were kept constant, then tax base to …nance public spending or some
of the parameters present in individual maximization problem would have to be adjusted.
16on labor income. The erosion in tax revenue is more signi…cant when the initial
tax rate on labor income is high, and the adjustment in the tax rate on labor
income increases when public spending requirements are higher. Hence, welfare
falls for both conscripts and non-conscripts when the initial tax rate on labor
income increases. This pattern is re‡ected in the last six columns in Table 3.
Moving across rows in Table 3, the results show that supplementary tax pay-
ments not surprisingly reduce welfare for conscripts. For example, the welfare loss
for conscripts in the new steady state is 1 percent when the initial tax rate on
labor income is 37.5 percent and the supplementary tax rate is 0 percent, while
the welfare loss for conscripts is 5.8 percent when the supplementary tax rate
is increased to 100 percent. Welfare e¤ects are less certain for non-conscripts
when supplementary tax payments by conscripts increase. The tax base with
respect to the supplementary tax rate is unchanged for di¤erent public spend-
ing requirements. However, private income falls relative to total income in the
economy when public spending increases, and relative income transfers between
generations due to supplementary tax payments increase. Non-conscripts may
therefore experience a welfare loss in the long run from supplementary tax pay-
ments by conscripts when the initial tax rate on labor income is high. Our results
suggest that the welfare e¤ect of using a draft tax generally is negative for non-
conscripts, although they may experience a marginal gain when a low wage tax
rate is accompanied by a high supplementary tax rate on conscripts.
The analysis is based on a stylized model, and the speci…c quantitative results
should be interpreted with caution. The model does not examine the dynamic
transition, and future generations may su¤er because earlier generations bene…t.
The only way to consider this inter-generational redistribution is to examine the
dynamic transition from the initial steady state to the …nal steady state. It seems
evident that such a move could require using public debt during the transition
in order not to increase the total tax burden of the transition generations, or
tax rates di¤erentiated according to age during the transition. Speci…cally, the
oldest cohorts having been subject to draft should see their tax burden being
left unchanged, while young transition generations escaping draft tax might be
required to pay a slightly higher share of their income in ordinary income taxes to
…nance transition. In order to …nd political support for the elimination of draft,
accepting such compensation mechanism might be attractive also for the young
otherwise subject to draft, as well as for the youngest generations exempt from
draft tax due to positive general equilibrium e¤ects in the long run.
4.2 Sensitivity analysis
The qualitative results above hold within a wide range of public expenditure
shares in relation to GDP. Also changing the initial stock of human capital, the
production function of human capital or preferences with regard to utility leave
the qualitative conclusions unchanged. As reported in Table 4, reducing the ini-
17tial stock of human capital without any other changes in exogenous parameters
leads into a slight increase in the interest rate, while the welfare e¤ects of the
supplementary tax rate, measured using equivalent variation, change only mar-
ginally. The welfare e¤ects of draft system with a given level of supplementary
draft tax are robust to variation in the elasticity of new human capital with
respect to time devoted to learning. Our …nal reported experiment shows that
the welfare e¤ects of supplementary tax rate on draftees remain unchanged when
the parameters related to leisure in the utility function are changed so that the
economy ends up in the same interest rate as in the initial steady-state.

















Initial stock of human capital:
h0 = 1.00 ; r = 5.00%
h0 = 0.75 ; r = 5.07%
h0 = 0.50 ; r = 5.14%
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Note: (a) 25 percent of the population is subject to draft and the initial tax rate on wage income is 37.5 percent.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Our results show that the widely held view of the draft as a socially cheap method
to recruit personnel for public services is a myth. To economists, such an ob-
servation may not be surprising, since volunteer recruitment via labor markets
traditionally is considered as the most e¤ective way to realize gains from the
division of labor and specialization. Adam Smith made a clear case against con-
scription and found an “irresistible superiority which a well-regulated standing
[=all-volunteer] army has over a militia [= conscription]” (Smith 1976 [1776],
p. 701). Smith’s observation and most other arguments against the draft mainly
rely on di¤erences in comparative advantages between citizens. What is striking
in our …ndings is that the ine¢ciency of the draft also emerges in the absence of
any such di¤erences.
In our approach, the ine¢ciency of the draft results from its speci…c incidence
over the life-cycle: The draft hits individuals in the early stages of their eco-
nomically active life, thereby postponing the accumulation of human capital and
18slowing down the growth in labor productivity. Moreover, the supplementary tax
on income during conscription involves a higher present value burden compared
to tax schemes with a more even distribution of tax payments over the life cycle.
It has a negative impact on saving and physical capital. It is noteworthy that
the draft also may harm people who are exempt due to the reduced build up of
human and physical capital.
By deliberately ignoring foregone gains from specialization and the division
of labor, our analysis tends to underestimate the true costs of the draft system.
We also ignore some potential bene…ts that a draft system might have relative
to voluntary enlistment. E.g., advocates of the draft like to argue that draftees
make the military more “representative” or bring liberal and critical thinking to
soldiery.11 Furthermore, some proponents of conscription consider it a quicker
way of raising large numbers of troops and the only way to sustain large military
reserve forces. We do not wish to discuss the validity of these arguments here
(see Warner and Asch, 2000, for a more elaborate discussion), but emphasize that
any potential bene…ts of the draft have to be weighed against the considerable
static and dynamic costs identi…ed here and in the economic literature.
Two omissions in our analysis open potential avenues for further research.
First, our assumption of a one-sector economy blurs an important aspect in the
comparison of conscription versus all-volunteer services: the substitution of equip-
ment and weaponry for labor that typically goes along with the abolition of the
draft (Sandler and Hartley, 1995, pp. 172f). A complete model should account for
such shifts in the input factor mix and the general equilibrium e¤ects. Second,
our focus on steady state equilibria ignores economic e¤ects during the transition
to the …nal steady state. As budgetary needs are likely to rise with all-volunteer
forces, some age cohorts might be burdened twice during such a transition. First,
by being drafted when young, and second by being taxed more heavily when
the volunteer system is installed. Analyzing whether and how the elimination of
conscription could produce a Pareto improvement is left for future research.
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